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Abstract
This paper raises some specific issues concerning the choice of exchange rate regime in
transition countries during the run-up to EU/EMU membership. It argues that there is no
“one-size-fits-all” exchange rate regime that accession countries should uniformly
adopt. It also argues that the Maastricht criterion on inflation is inconsistent with the
catching-up process because of the Balassa-Samuelson effect and that this inconsistency
will encourage a “weighing-in” syndrome: like the boxer who refrains from eating for
hours prior to the weigh-in only to consume a big meal once the weigh-in is over, the
candidate country will maintain very tight monetary policy and resort to all sorts of
techniques (freezing of administered prices, lowering of consumption taxes, etc.) to
squeeze down inflation prior to accession only to shift back gears after it has joined the
EMU. Indeed, the convergence of short-term interest rates to EMU levels that will come
with accession will automatically mean a loosening of monetary policy after the country
has become a member of the monetary union. That loosening will be reinforced if the
country had previously allowed its exchange rate to appreciate against the euro. The
result of this stop-go cycle is that the efficiency of economic management will suffer. It
would be better to recognize the principle of the Balassa-Samuelson effect explicitly in
the Maastricht criteria by giving more room for maneuver than the one provided by the
present rule. The paper makes suggestions on how the Maastricht criterion on inflation
could be adjusted and discusses their merits. It concludes that a reasonable compromise
would be to define the permissible inflation deviation in reference to the average
inflation rate of the euro zone, not the three EU members with the lowest inflation rate.
* Advisor to the President of the National Bank of Hungary. An earlier version of this paper
was presented at the conference organized by the International Triffin Foundation on “The
Fragility of the International Financial System”, Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium, September 14-15,
2000. It was also published as CEPS Working Document No. 153 in November 2000. The
author would like to thank Zsolt Darvas, Daniel Gros, Eduard Hochreiter, András Simon and
János Vincze for their useful comments without implicating them. The views expressed in the
paper are strictly personal and in no way commit the National Bank of Hungary.POLICY IMPLICATIONS FOR EUROPE
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SHOULD THE ACCESSION COUNTRIES BE PARTLY
EXEMPT FROM RESPECTING THE MAASTRICHT
INFLATION CRITERIA ?
The problems posed for the accession countries by the Maastricht criteria is the main theme of
this paper by a Hungarian economist, adviser to the President of the National Bank of Hungary,
According to this paper, the accession countries have a clear interest in joining the Euro zone
and, thus, should adopt an exchange rate regime likely to prepare the accession economy to the
discipline of EMU. However, the issues to be handled by the monetary authorities are complex
and, to some extent conflicting. The perspective of accession may induce massive capital
inflows which might lead to an overvalued exchange rate.
The tasks of monetary policy, already complicated under conditions of capital mobility, are
rendered even more difficult by the need to formulate a strategy to cope with the Maastricht
criteria. As far as the ceiling on public debt and budget deficits is concerned the task is rather
clear-cut, albeit not necessarily easy. Strict application of the inflation criterion could on the
other hand require an excessively tight monetary policy and this, in turn, could lead to
additional capital inflows and other problems of monetary management.
Furthermore, one of the criteria for joining the euro zone is that inflation cannot exceed by more
than 1.5 percentage points the average rate of inflation in the three EU countries where inflation
is the lowest.
But this might be difficult to achieve due to the so-called Balassa-Samuelson effect, according
to which the rate of inflation of a fast growing low-income country that participates in a tight
exchange rate arrangement will typically be above that of its trading partners.  The accession
countries might thus face a long period of higher inflation as long as they are catching-up (in
terms of their real income per capita) to the EU average.  A similar phenomenon has already
been observed after the accession of  Portugal, Spain and Greece and should, therefore, not be
assimilated with “classical” monetary inflation.However, this “catching-up” aspect of inflation
has not been allowed for in the formulation of the “Maastricht criteria” posing thus a potential
conflict of policy targets for accession countries.
The most appropriate way to solve this dilemma would, according to the author, be to take the
“Balassa-Samuelson effect” explicitly into account in the Maastricht criteria, and thus allow the
rate of inflation in low-income accession countries to exceed somewhat, during the catching-up
period, the norm currently provided for in the Treaty
Jørgen Mortensen
CEPS Associate Senior Research Fellow and Manager of ENEPRI1
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Maastricht and the Choice of Exchange Rate Regime
in Transition Countries during the Run-Up to EMU
György Szapáry
I. Introduction
With the creation of EMU, a new chapter has been opened in the debate about the issue
of exchange rate regime choice.  At stake is the selection of an exchange rate regime
that will best serve the interests of the accession countries from Central and Eastern
Europe (CEE) as they prepare to join the EU and to meet the Maastricht criteria which
will allow them to enter later the EMU. There is little doubt that from an economic
standpoint, the CEEs, small economies as they are, have a strong interest in joining the
euro zone once they have liberalized the trade and capital flows and have become a
member of the EU. Entry into the euro zone will mean lower risk premium and interest
rates, as well as lower transaction costs (to mention just the most obvious economic
advantages), along with a say in shaping the ECB’s monetary policy, the independence
from which becomes more imaginary than real once a small country has de facto
integrated into the economy of the euro zone. The question is whether there is an ideal
exchange rate regime for transition countries during the run-up to EMU which can
ensure stability, maintain competitiveness, promote structural reforms and also help to
meet the Maastricht criterion on inflation.
The purpose of this paper is not to discuss the many aspects of the issue of exchange
rate regime choice, a topic which is examined and debated in a vast body of literature.
Rather, it would like to raise, particularly in the light of the current high degree of
globalization of financial flows, some specific issues facing the accession countries
which are closest to EU/EMU membership. In this context, the paper raises the issue of
the adequacy of the Maastricht criterion on inflation and makes some suggestions for
adjusting that criterion.
The accession countries maintain a wide diversity of exchange rate regimes: practically
all varieties can be found from currency board arrangements (e.g., Estonia) to floatingMaastricht and the Choice of Exchange Rate Regime in Transition Countries
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regimes (e.g., the Czech Republic and Poland since April)
1. Hungary’s system is
somewhere between these two ends: a preannounced crawling peg with a relatively
narrow band of ± 2.25 percent. A common goal of these countries is to move toward
meeting the Maastricht criteria while completing the transition, but there seems to be no
direct link between the exchange rate regime in place and the progress achieved in
meeting that goal. For instance, close to EU inflation level has been achieved in Estonia
with a currency board and in the Czech Republic with a floating regime; and
approximately the same path of disinflation has been secured in Poland with a wide
band crawling peg and in Hungary with a narrow band crawling peg (Chart 1). This is
testimony to the fact that other policies matter more than the exchange rate regime. Yet
there is an issue of exchange regime choice because the ultimate goal is to fix the
currencies to the euro and that process should be as orderly and efficient as possible.
II. Characteristics of CEEs from the point of view of exchange rate regime
         choice
The acceding transition countries share a number of characteristics which have a
bearing on exchange rate policy. First, their wages and non-tradable prices are lower
than those of the EU countries. Since they have a lower level of technical development
and productivity, they are expected to grow faster than the EU as real convergence
proceeds. This means that their wages and non-tradable prices will grow faster in
accordance with the Balassa-Samuelson (BS) effect. The BS effect arises from the fact
that the growth of productivity differs among sectors while wages tend to be less
differentiated. Typically, productivity growth is faster in the traded goods sector than in
the non-traded goods sector, such as services. To the extent that the faster productivity
growth in the traded goods sector pushes up the wages in all sectors, the relative prices
of the non-traded goods to those of the traded goods will rise. Since the growth of
productivity is, by definition, faster in a catching-up economy than in a more mature
economy, the BS effect implies that, ceteris paribus, the CPI of the former will rise
                                                
1 Until April 2000, Poland had a preannounced crawling peg with a band which had been
progressively widened to ± 15 percent.Maastricht and the Choice of Exchange Rate Regime in Transition Countries
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faster than that of the latter, as the levels of productivity, wages, and non-traded goods
prices converge between the two economies.4
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Chart 1: Inflation in Transition Countries, January 1990 - September 2000
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Hence, the real exchange rates of the accession countries, as measured by the CPI, will
appreciate during the catching-up process. However, this process will necessarily take
many years and the real appreciation has to be broadly in line with the underlying BS
effect if the country is to avoid loss of competitiveness and serious balance of payments
problems.
The inflation differentials observed within the EMU and the approaching enlargement
of the EU have focused interest on the BS effect. ECB (1999) notes that there is clear
evidence that the BS effect has been at work within the euro area, though it does not
provide precise estimates. IMF (2000) reports calculations estimating the BS effect in
the range of 1.5 and 2 percent per year for certain individual member countries of the
EU. Pelkmans-Gros-Nunez Ferrer (2000) make precise estimates for the candidate
countries and find that the BS effect could be around 3.5-4 percent for these countries.
Simon and Kovács (1998 and 2000) estimate the BS effect for Hungary at 1.9 percent
per year during the period 1991-98. For Slovenia, IMF (2000) reports an estimate of 2.5
percent per annum. While these estimates for the candidate countries vary reflecting the
different methodologies of calculations, they all show that the BS effect for these
countries exceeds the 1.5 percent permissible inflation deviation under the Maastricht
criterion.
Second, as a result of the liberalization of trade and payments, the economies of the
accession countries are highly open and integrated into a global financial system in
which the flow of capital is much less restricted than it was when, for instance, Spain,
Portugal, and Greece joined the EU. At the same time, because of their status as
emerging markets, the accession countries remain exposed to volatile capital flows, as
witnessed during the Russian financial crisis of 1998 when capital fled these countries,
irrespective of the state of their fundamentals or exchange rate regimes.
Third, the candidate countries still face relative price adjustments beyond the BS effect,
due to the continuous structural reforms and liberalization in such areas as
telecommunication, energy, transportation and healthcare. The inflationary impact of
these changes is less stable and progressive than that of the BS effect because it is
linked to the timing of reforms which, in turn, is often linked to the privatization of
those activities.Maastricht and the Choice of Exchange Rate Regime in Transition Countries
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Fourth, these countries have small domestic markets and rely heavily on exports and
imports for investment and growth. A loss of competitiveness translates fairly rapidly
into a deterioration of the balance of payments.
When considering the choice of an appropriate exchange rate regime, the authorities of
the accession countries are therefore confronted with three conflicting objectives: (i) to
ensure reasonable exchange rate stability in the face of capital volatility; (ii) to secure an
orderly real exchange rate appreciation more or less along the path dictated by the BS
effect; and (iii) to move toward meeting the Maastricht criterion on inflation.
The stability objective would be best served by a fixed rate regime. However, because
of the faster inflation inherent in the catching-up process and the risk that the required
wage flexibility and strong supportive policies to sustain a fixed rate can not be
implemented, a rigidly fixed rate carries the danger of leading to a rapid appreciation of
the real exchange rate which could prove intolerable for most countries. In Estonia, for
example, where a currency board arrangement is in effect, the real exchange rate
appreciated by more than 100 percent between 1993 and 1999 (Chart 2). Estonia has
been able to cope with this appreciation because its wages are very low (relative to the
skill of the labor force) and because the small size of the country means that foreign
direct investment (FDI) was able to cover a large part of its sizable current account
deficit, which averaged about 10 percent of GDP in 1996-98. The other countries would
not be able to tolerate such rapid appreciation and such high current account deficit. The
real appreciation in Estonia is perhaps an extreme case and there are examples of fixed
rate regimes where the real appreciation was more modest and gradual. The point is that
a fixed rate needs the backing of strong monetary and fiscal policies and flexible wages
which may not exist in all cases. Furthermore, a fixed rate would deprive the country of
one of its instruments, the nominal appreciation of the currency, that could help the
country to bring inflation down to the Maastricht level without resorting to excessively
tight monetary and fiscal policy.7
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A flexible exchange rate arrangement, in the form of a wide band or free floating regime
could, in principle, provide the possibility for a gradual appreciation of the real
exchange rate in conformity with the BS effect and could also help the country to meet
the inflation target without relying on unduly restrictive monetary and fiscal policy.
However, because transition countries are particularly exposed to the volatility of
speculative capital flows, such regimes may lead, as seen during 1997-98, to large real
exchange rate variability. Although opinions differ on how bad real exchange rate
variability actually is, there are convincing empirical studies in the literature which
demonstrate their negative economic effects
2. While the multinational firms operating in
these countries might more easily cope with real exchange rate fluctuations, the smaller
domestically owned firms, whose development is essential for broad-based economic
prosperity, are much more sensitive to changes in competitiveness. A wide band or free
floating regime also carries the danger that if the country’s fundamentals are seen by the
markets as appropriate, the inflow of capital will lead to an excessive appreciation of the
currency. Good fundamentals are not a precondition though, as evidenced by the large
inflows into Russia prior to the summer of 1998.
One argument often made in favor of floating or wide bands is that it provides better
protection against speculative attacks. However, the experience during the Russian
crisis of Poland and Israel, two countries considered as emerging markets, showed that
when there is a sudden shift in market sentiment, wide bands do not shield against
speculative attacks
3. Another argument is that because of the greater potential risk of
depreciation, wide bands discourage speculative capital inflows. The experience of the
above two countries prior to the Russian crisis does not support that argument, as both
countries witnessed large capital inflows.
Narrower bands reduce exchange rate variability and can also prevent an excessive
appreciation/depreciation at times of capital inflows/outflows. Whether this is a sensible
policy depends on the magnitude of the capital flows. Hungary has so far managed to
prevent an undue appreciation of its currency without excessive sterilization costs
4 and
                                                
2 See for example Baldwin and Krugman (1989), Campa (1993) and Gourinchas (1999).
3 See Darvas and Szapáry (2000).
4 See Szapáry and Jakab (1998)._______Maastricht and the Choice of Exchange Rate Regime in Transition Countries________
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successfully defended the forint without excessive loss of reserves in the wake of the
Russian crisis. This experience, and that of Greece when the authorities defended the
drachma during the Asian crisis, turned out to be beneficial, since output growth
strengthened and inflation continued to decline in both countries after the defense of
their currencies. The point to make here is that there are circumstances, i.e. when the
fundamentals are right, under which it makes sense to defend the currency in order to
maintain stability. A narrow band, if it is supported by credible policies, may also lead
to lower premium on domestic interest rates, since the risk of depreciation and exchange
rate variability are lower
5. That said, a narrow band is not necessarily the right regime
for all cases; the break-up of ERM1 illustrates that point. A narrow band, just as a fixed
rate, needs to be backed by adequate supportive policies.
III. The convergence play
The developments of the recent past place the issue of exchange regime choice in a
somewhat new light in the case of the accession countries. The most important event is
the creation of the EMU and the reasonable expectation that the applicant countries will
follow policies that will allow them to become a member of EMU in the not too distant
future. This seems to have provided enough of certainty for the markets to engage in
speculation for a convergence of interest rates and an appreciation of the exchange rates,
if the fundamentals of the country are judged to be broadly appropriate. Another
important development is the liberalization of markets. Capital has never been as free as
it is now to move across borders and the progress in technology has made the flow of
capital much easier and faster. There is a vast amount of potentially fickle capital ready
to take a higher risk in emerging markets in order to take advantage of higher expected
returns. Fund managers throughout the world invest only a small portion of their
portfolio in emerging markets to maximize returns. Investment banks offer dedicated
emerging market funds to investors, while advising them to invest only a small portion
                                                
5 Until the Russian crisis, the interest rate premium was lower in Hungary which maintains a
narrow band preannounced crawling peg regime than in the Czech Republic with a free floating
regime and in Poland with a wide band regime. The Russian crisis triggered a change in market
sentiment and the interest rate premium in Hungary increased to the level of that prevailing in
the Czech Republic and Poland (see Darvas and Szapáry, op. cit.)._______Maastricht and the Choice of Exchange Rate Regime in Transition Countries________
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of their total portfolio into such funds. While all this sounds very conservative from the
point of view of the investor, it adds up to billions of volatile dollars available to move
around among emerging markets. Capital flows that are insignificant for markets of the
size of the United States or the euro zone can be very disruptive for the exchange
markets of small countries like the Czech Republic, Hungary or even Poland.
Accession countries have some characteristics that promise good returns with less risks
for speculative capital. In order to meet the inflation criterion for joining the EMU, the
monetary authorities are likely to maintain a nominal interest rate level that is higher
than the uncovered interest rate parity, encouraging investment in fixed income
investments, such as government securities. The favorable growth prospects attract
investment into the stock markets of these countries by investors both with a short run
and a medium to long run perspective. The experience of Greece, Portugal and Spain,
where stock markets outperformed the other European markets in the years following
their entry into the EU, serves as a good example. The expected return on both of these
types of portfolio investments is enhanced by the anticipated appreciation of the
exchange rate.
IV. No “one-size-fits-all” exchange rate regime
This situation creates specific problems for the accession countries. First, it is too early
for them to be caught up in the convergence play. The date of EMU membership is still
uncertain and an undue appreciation of their currencies or a too rapid fall in domestic
interest rates will not be consistent with their stabilization goals. Second, these countries
remain vulnerable to shifts in market sentiment triggered by financial crises elsewhere.
The more speculative capital enters the country, the more capital will be able to leave it
when market perceptions change, undermining stability. In such circumstances, controls
on short-term capital flows might be of some help. Although such controls can be
circumvented once trade and long-term capital movements have been liberalized, they
can mute the magnitude of short-term capital movements by throwing sand into the
wheels. Nevertheless, since the ultimate goal is full liberalization, short-term capital
controls can only provide a temporary relief. At best one can argue in favor of not
making a full liberalization of short-term capital flows a precondition for EU accession,
only a precondition for joining ERM2._______Maastricht and the Choice of Exchange Rate Regime in Transition Countries________
11
The experiences with different exchange rate regimes in the transition countries and
elsewhere convincingly  show that there is no “one-size-fits-all” exchange rate regime
that accession countries should uniformly adopt in the run-up to EU/EMU membership.
There are many factors that need to be taken into account when selecting an exchange
rate regime. The most obvious is the strength of the political commitment to pursue
macroeconomic policies – in particular, fiscal, monetary and incomes policies – which
will ensure internal and external stability. The looser that commitment is, the less likely
it is that a rigidly fixed system can survive the pressures of the market. The progress
with structural reforms, such as privatization, the lifting of price controls, healthcare
reforms, etc., also need to be taken into consideration, since they influence the future
path of inflation. Slower progress in these areas would argue in favor of adopting a
more flexible exchange rate regime to accommodate the potential inflationary shocks.
Prior to EU membership, candidate countries are free to adopt the exchange rate regime
of their choice and they can enter the EU with their prevailing exchange rate regime. At
some point after their accession to the EU, they are expected to enter ERM2. The logic
of ERM2 excludes the adoption of crawling pegs, free floating without a central rate,
and pegs against a currency other than the euro. It seems that the EU and the ECB will
accept euro-based currency board arrangements (CBA) if they are deemed sustainable,
although the question of the exchange rate being a “matter of common interest” is raised
if it turns out that the exchange rate under the CBA is not sustainable. The EU is likely
to turn around this problem by declaring that CBA may be compatible with ERM2 as a
“unilateral commitment”, meaning that the Eurosystem is not committed to take part in
any possible defense of the peg. Since a rigidly fixed rate in the form of a CBA, or in
any another form for that matter (e.g. the hard currency policy of Austria)
6, can be a
powerful catalyst for the adoption of the right policies, the acceptance of the CBA as a
form of participation in ERM2 is appropriate. The EU is likely to take the view that
euroization is not compatible with ERM2 on the grounds that it should be the final act
of the convergence process and that the new members should receive treatment equal to
that of the initial members with respect to the fulfillment of the convergence criteria. In
my view, the most serious problem with euro-ization or a CBA is that it takes away the
                                                
6 See Hochreiter and Winckler (1995)._______Maastricht and the Choice of Exchange Rate Regime in Transition Countries________
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possibility of an appreciation of the nominal exchange rate as an instrument of
disinflation, placing all the burden of meeting the Maastricht criterion on inflation on
monetary and fiscal policy. This brings me to point out an inconsistency built into the
Maastrich criteria.
V. Encourage “weighing-in” syndrome or change the Maastricht criterion
on inflation?
One of the Maastricht criteria is that one year prior to joining the EMU, the accession
country’s rate of inflation should not exceed by more than 1.5 percentage point the
average rate of inflation in those three EU countries where inflation is the lowest. Since,
as pointed out earlier, the catching-up process implies a higher rate of inflation, it is not
logical to demand the same level of inflation from countries at very different stages of
development. The same level of inflation can only be achieved either by a very
restrictive monetary and fiscal policy which may result in an excessive sacrifice to
growth and employment or by an appreciation of the nominal exchange rate. The
appreciation of the nominal exchange rate is likely to be resisted because of a fear of
loss of competitiveness as capital inflows intensify with the approach of EMU
membership. Since there is a lag between an appreciation of the nominal exchange rate
and the concomitant slowing down of CPI, the combination of higher inflation and a
nominal appreciation may lead to excessive loss of competitiveness. This will
encourage the candidate countries to adopt an attitude which one might call the
“weighing-in” syndrome: like the boxer who refrains from eating for hours prior to the
weigh-in only to consume a big meal once the weigh-in is over, the candidate country
will maintain very tight monetary policy and resort to all sorts of techniques (freezing of
administered prices, lowering of consumption taxes, etc.) to squeeze down inflation
prior to accession only to shift back gears after it has joined the EMU. The convergence
of short-term interest rates to EMU levels that will come with accession will
automatically mean a loosening of monetary policy after the country has become a
member of the monetary union. That loosening will be reinforced if the country had
previously allowed its exchange rate to appreciate against the euro. The result of this
stop-go cycle is that the efficiency of economic management will suffer._______Maastricht and the Choice of Exchange Rate Regime in Transition Countries________
13
It would be better to recognize the principle of the BS effect explicitly in the Maastricht
criteria by giving more room for maneuver than the one provided by the present rule
which falls short of most estimates of the BS effect. From a strictly economic point of
view, the logical solution would be to link the permissible inflation deviation to the size
of the productivity growth differential, since it is that differential which determines the
BS effect. However, because the growth of productivity is subject to cyclical factors
which can differ from one country to the other, it would be difficult to find a standard
measurement of the BS effect which can be uniformly applied for defining the
permissible inflation deviation. A better solution would be to group both the member
countries and the accession countries on a per capita income basis and define the
reference value for inflation deviation on that basis. The reference for high income
countries would be average inflation rate in the highest per capita income group, and the
reference for the low income countries would be the average inflation rate in the lowest
per capita income group. The logic of grouping the countries on a per capita income
basis is that it is a good proxy of the level of development and therefore of the extent of
the expected faster productivity growth (i.e., of the real convergence) and hence of the
BS effect. Indeed, it is not surprising that the EMU member countries with the lowest
per capita incomes, Portugal and Spain, have recorded higher than average inflation
rates within the euro zone (Chart 3). Such a differentiated treatment would of course
violate the principle of equal treatment between the initial EMU members and those
who join the monetary union later. It is understandable that the principle of equal
treatment was upheld when the initial criteria for joining the EMU were negotiated and
the founding members established the monetary union. It is difficult to imagine how it
could have been otherwise, since finding an agreement on the different rates of inflation
to be assigned to the different countries could have paralyzed the negotiations for ever.14
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However, now that the monetary union is established and functioning, a more fine tuned
approach that takes into account the laws of economic development would better serve
the efficiency of economic management.
Though logical from a purely economic point of view, there also lies a danger for the
accession countries in the differentiation of the permissible EMU entry-level inflation
rate on the basis of the level of economic development of the candidate countries. This
danger stems from the popular fear in the EMU that such “permissiveness” could dilute
the price stability within the euro zone and hence to weaken the euro. Such fear could
weaken the political support for enlargement and delay the accession of the CEEs,
particularly those whose per capita income is lowest. A reasonable compromise would
be to define the permissible inflation deviation in reference to the average inflation rate
of the euro zone (the Harmonized Index of Consumer Prices, HICP), not the three EU
members with the lowest inflation rate. It is understandable that when Maastricht was
negotiated and there were several national monetary policies, the founding members
wanted to encourage convergence toward the lowest level of inflation. Now that EMU
exists and there is a single monetary policy responsible for the inflation in the zone as a
whole, it would make more sense to define the deviation in reference to the average
inflation rate in the euro zone. In July 2000, this would have given an additional margin
of 0.7 percent (1.8 percent EMU average inflation vs. 1.1 percent average inflation in
the three EU countries with the lowest inflation) for a country wishing to join the
EMU
7. Although this difference is small, at such low levels of inflation even a
difference of this magnitude is not insignificant. Another option would be simply to
increase the permissible inflation deviation, but this could also be regarded as a
watering down of the Maastricht criterion and therefore could raise the same popular
fear as mentioned above.
                                                
7 Within the EU, the lowest inflation rates were recorded by the United Kingdom and Sweden,
which are not members of the EMU. Within the EMU, the average inflation was 1.4 percent in
the three lowest inflation countries. In line with the methodology used by the ECB to assess
compliance with the Maastricht criterion, the figures refer to the increase in the 12-month
average of the HICP during the year ending in July 2000 over the year ending in July 1999._______Maastricht and the Choice of Exchange Rate Regime in Transition Countries________
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VI. Conclusions
As can be seen from the above discussion, the characteristics of the economies of
accession countries, their decision to adopt a track leading to membership in the euro
zone, and the globalization of financial markets have confronted the authorities of these
countries with a complex set of issues to be taken into account when choosing their
exchange rate system. While EU/EMU accession is still several years away, it is close
enough to require decisions as to what type of exchange rate regime will best serve
these countries’ economic development and the transition to EMU membership. As a
result of the combined impact of globalization and EU convergence, accession countries
are likely to experience continued financial capital inflows which are creating difficult
problems of economic management, even if most of this capital stays in the country. At
the same time, these countries remain exposed to shifts in market sentiment which can
cause a sudden reversal of capital flows not otherwise justified by the development in
the fundamentals of the country. There are no clear-cut solutions for the management of
this situation which poses one of the greatest challenges for the monetary authorities of
these countries for the years ahead, all the way up until EMU membership. This is one
reason why those CEE countries which are the most prepared and the most integrated
into the euro zone should have a strong interest in an early accession to the EU and the
EMU. Meanwhile, the choice of the exchange rate regime in the run-up to EMU should
be essentially determined by the state of the reform process and the political
commitment to continued reforms and sound macroeconomic policies, backed by
sufficient wage flexibility to deal with possible reform-induced or external shocks. If
that commitment is strong and wages are flexible, a more rigid exchange rate regime
can be sustainable. Otherwise a flexible arrangement would be more appropriate._______Maastricht and the Choice of Exchange Rate Regime in Transition Countries________
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